AID AND VULNERABILITY

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Working paper no. 88

October 2013
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Abstract

Managing and identifying risks are a key challenge for Low Income Countries (LICs), which are extremely vulnerable to exogenous shocks. However, the use of risk management tools by developing countries is quite limited. The paper discusses in which ways aid could strengthen the capacity of LICs to deal with vulnerability to external shocks and to manage capital flows. We provide some novel empirical evidence on the potential role of aid as output stabilizer and shock absorber in recipient countries, and on aid unpredictability.

JEL Codes: F35; O11; O19.
Keywords: Foreign aid; Volatility; Vulnerability; Business cycle.

*I wish to thank Giulia Bettin, Camelia Minoiu, Alessandro Missale, and Ugo Panizza for useful suggestions on an earlier draft of the paper. This working paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this working paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF and IMF policy.

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Development aid fell by 4% in real terms in 2012, following a 2% fall in 2011. The continuing financial crisis and euro zone turmoil has led several governments to tighten their budgets, which has had a direct impact on development aid.

(OECD, April 3, 2013)

1 Introduction

Managing and identifying risks are a key challenge for Low Income Countries (LICs). Poor countries are extremely vulnerable to exogenous shocks, such as natural disasters, commodity price shocks, a deterioration of the terms of trade, and capital outflows. These adverse shocks have severe and long-lasting consequences on the domestic economy: they generally dampen output growth, increase macroeconomic volatility and undermine public debt sustainability. However, the use of risk management tools by developing countries is quite limited. This fact is the result of the limited access to appropriate financial instruments to hedge sovereign risk, especially because of a lack of credibility and of poor institutional and political capacity (Claessens, 2005).

Foreign aid is a primary source of external finance for developing countries, amounting to more than 10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in several low income countries. The paper discusses in which ways foreign aid could strengthen the capacity of LICs to deal with vulnerability to external shocks. Notwithstanding the large amount of resources devoted to foreign assistance, aid effectiveness is a very much debated issue (Rajan and Subramanian, 2008; Bruckner, 2013; Juselius, Møller, and Tarp, 2013). One of the reasons why aid could not translate into higher growth is related to its volatility. The procyclicality of aid disbursements to donors’ economic conditions may create a gap between aid flows and country needs. As the opening quotation makes it clear, the great recession has inverted a lasting upward trend in official development assistance (ODA), forcing developing countries to face an unexpected scenario. Some recent findings support the view that financial crises in advanced economies actually induced a contraction of official assistance to developing countries (Frot, 2009; Gravier-Rymaszewska, 2012). In addition, one aspect that could mitigate the growth dividend of foreign aid is its unpredictability, generally measured as the deviation of aid commitments from disbursements (Celasun and Walliser, 2008; Kodama, 2012). Unpredictable aid has asymmetric negative effects on the level and composition of government expenditures, given that aid shortfalls are likely to reduce investment projects, while windfalls are generally spent on consumption rather than investment. In this vein, volatile and unpredictable aid may represent an additional source of vulnerability for LICs, rather than offsetting exogenous shocks.

Figure 1 shows the evolution of aid commitments and disbursements since the late 1960s. Three issues are worth stressing. First, after two decades in which aid (at constant prices) was quite stable, ODA increased rapidly since 2000, but this increase came to an abrupt stop in 2009. This severe decline in aid inflows could have direct consequences on the fiscal balance and on the balance-of-payment of aid-dependent countries. Second, the variability of aid, measured by the coefficient of variation, did not increase over time. Third, even if volatility may be contained, unpredictability
is an issue. The diagram, in fact, shows a significant difference between donors’ pledges and actual allocations, especially in recent years.

A first issue to deal with to assess the potential role of aid as a shock absorber for LICs is the dependence of aid on external conditions, such as the business cycle in donor countries. We formally test this hypothesis by looking at the determinants of bilateral donors’ aid flows and we find that foreign aid shrinks when donors are in a recession or they experience a banking crisis. This suggests that aid inflows could be considered by recipient countries as an asset on which they exercise a limited control and which is subject to a certain degree of volatility and uncertainty.

Against this backdrop, two main research questions need to be addressed in order to understand how aid can actively contribute to dampen vulnerabilities in LICs. First, we want to understand whether foreign aid can be a useful hedging resource. To this aim, we will look at the correlations between aid inflows and other public and private capital inflows in a sample of developing countries. Second, we will focus on aid unpredictability. We will try to measure the extent of the problem and to identify the recipients’ characteristics which are likely to be associated with donors’ reneging their pledges.

We find that aid is quite persistent and it seems to act as an output stabilizer in recipient countries, since low-growth countries receive larger aid inflows than boom countries and aid flows increase when countries experience a deterioration of the terms of trade. In addition, the negative (positive) correlations between aid and foreign direct investment (debt service) suggests that aid

Source: OECD - DAC database. The coefficient of variation is calculated on aid disbursements on rolling 5-year periods.
could act as a stabilization tool, given that it increases in crisis periods and when the private sector reduces its exposition. This implies that aid is a critical asset to help developing countries coping with exogenous shocks and fluctuation in capital flows. However, in answering our second question, we find that aid unpredictability is a relevant source of concern. It increases with the per capita GDP of the recipient country and shows an hectic pattern over time, with a sharp increase since the 2000s.

The evidence discussed in the paper would suggest that, under the conditions that donors make aid more predictable and recipients adopt possible strategies to cope with aid volatility (i.e. use reserve accumulation as a stabilization tool), foreign aid could act as an additional asset in the government balance sheet, contributing to the development of a sovereign Asset and Liability Management (ALM) strategy in LICs.\(^1\) If this were the case, foreign aid could help improving risk management in developing countries, with positive effects on macroeconomic management, investment, and growth.

With respect to the existing literature, this paper provides a comprehensive discussion of the conditions under which aid could help mitigating risks and vulnerabilities in developing countries, bringing together pieces of evidence about the determinants of aid flows, aid volatility, and aid predictability. We also present some original empirical evidence on a large sample of donor and recipient countries. Specifically, since we are interested in the reaction of aid to exogenous shocks, our analysis has the advantage of covering the recent global financial crisis, which has negatively affected donor and recipient countries, with possible ambiguous effects on aid flows.

The paper is articulated as follows. The next Section provides a brief overview of the vulnerability of poor countries to external shocks and of the policy tools available to mitigate the effect of exogenous shocks, while Section 3 discusses the potential role of aid as an insurance mechanism. Section 4 focuses on the dependence of aid disbursements on donors’ economic conditions, to measure the degree of control of recipients on aid flows. To assess how aid could act as a shock absorber, the paper empirically looks at the correlation between aid, other capital flows and different measures of external shocks in recipient countries (Section 5), and on aid volatility and unpredictability (Section 6). Finally, the concluding section discusses how aid flows could be managed by donors and recipients in order to contribute to reduce risks and promote growth.

\(^1\) Asset and liability management (ALM) has been traditionally used by financial institutions to manage price risks with market-based instruments and it is now adopted by advanced and emerging countries to better manage public debt. Its application to developing countries has been widely discussed in the late 1980s and in the 1990s, on the backdrop of debt crisis and commodity price shocks faced by many developing countries (Masuoka, 1990). In an ALM framework, the main target is to manage and mitigate the financial risk exposure of the public sector as a whole, in order to preserve the macroeconomic conditions for a sustainable growth path. More broadly, ALM serves as a tool to identify long-term fiscal challenges and to help countries to achieve a more balanced asset and liability structure, so to minimize the adverse consequences of exogenous shocks (Das, Lu, Papaioannou, and Petrova, 2012). From a sovereign perspective, this means dealing with an increase of the value of government liabilities or with a fall in revenues without significant changes in the tax rate and in the provision of public services.
Figure 2: Vulnerability index in low-income countries

2 Managing vulnerability in low income countries

2.1 Exogenous shocks

Developing countries are particularly exposed to a variety of external shocks which hinder economic growth and magnify the volatility of real per capita GDP. Henceforth, mitigating vulnerability is a key policy target for poor countries. In this perspective, LICs are, on average, on the right path, reflecting their efforts toward macroeconomic stability, the undertaking of structural reforms, debt relief, strong GDP growth, and the global positive economic conditions during the ‘great moderation’ (Figure 2). Nevertheless, the recent global crisis pointed out again the dependence of low income countries on external macroeconomic conditions, especially for what concern external and fiscal vulnerabilities, which suffered from the exceptional tail shocks to external demand, declining terms-of-trade, and low government revenue (Dabla-Norris and Bal-Gunduz, 2012).

Abrupt changes in commodity prices and terms-of-trade instability are among the most signif-

2 Economic volatility in developing countries is due also to a variety of internal (endogenous) factors, such as conflicts and economic mismanagement (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Thaicharoen, 2003). Raddatz (2007), for instance, quantifies the relative magnitude of external and internal shocks on real per capita GDP in LICs and find that the former explains only 11 percent of the variance of real GDP.

3 The vulnerability index, as well as its sub-components (external, fiscal and institutional vulnerability), is developed by the IMF for a large sample of LICs since 1990. We thank Yasemin Bal Gunduz for providing the detailed historical data set on the Vulnerability Index.
icant sources of external macroeconomic shocks and, dampening export and productivity growth, are positively associated with changes in output growth (Deaton, 1999; Collier and Goderis, 2012).

Other than being exposed to increasing food prices, over the last decades LICs have been increasingly subject to natural disasters. The economic costs of natural disasters in developing countries are extremely high, in terms of GDP growth, trade disruption and fiscal balance (Noy, 2009; Radlatz, 2009; Laframboise and Loko, 2012).

Capital flows could also contribute to the overall macroeconomic instability. Although capital inflows may bring a number of potential advantages to developing countries, making it possible to finance investment in infrastructures, fostering capital deepening and complementing limited domestic savings, it has long been established that financial globalization brings several risks and has differentiated effects on domestic investment and growth according to different sources of foreign finance (Bosworth and Collins, 1999). On theory, financial integration should help mitigating the macroeconomic effect of external shocks. Access to foreign private capital should promote economic diversification by developing countries – reducing risks – and facilitating consumption smoothing. However, contagion and herding in capital flows and the strong dependence from advanced economies could be an additional source of vulnerability for LDCs.

The empirical evidence suggests that the balance between risks and benefits of financial globalization in developing countries is mixed, at best (Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei, 2009; Agénor, 2013). Figure 3 shows the recent path of aid, remittances, foreign direct investment, equity portfolio investment and debt flows. The last decade has seen a great upsurge of FDI. The increase of remittances is somewhat less steeper but also smoother and it has been less conditioned by the global crisis. The volumes of portfolio investment and foreign aid are smaller. The former are the most volatile, while aid is the stablest source of funding. Looking at the crisis years confirm the general trend: FDI and other portfolio and debt flows dramatically collapsed in 2008 and 2009, while remittances and aid proved more resilient.

2.2 Dealing with shocks

Traditionally, poor countries relied mainly on bilateral and multilateral assistance and to a growing government debt to deal with external shocks. The capacity to cope with exogenous shocks depends also on the level and composition of international reserves. In the current climate of global financial crises, emerging and developing countries have further and steadily increased the demand for international reserves for precautionary purposes. Self-insurance, mainly in forms of accumulation of international reserves and savings of windfall revenues from natural resources, gained importance in the last global crisis, but it is extremely costly, especially in terms of missed productive investment.

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4Raddatz (2007) calculates that a one standard deviation negative shock to commodity prices results in about a 1 percent decrease in the per-capita GDP of LICs.

5In particular, the current global financial crisis is pointing out the risks of excessive reliance on foreign bank lending in developing countries, given that foreign banks can act as a channel to propagate a local shock globally and that foreign bank presence in LICs is associated with lower credit to the private sector, with a stronger contraction of private credit during during the global crisis (Detragiache, Tressel, and Gupta, 2008; Claessens and van Horen, 2013; Haas and Horen, 2013).
Some of the tools designed by multilateral institutions are explicitly devoted to cope with external shocks, but they are \emph{ex-post} instruments, which generally come with costly conditionalities. In addition, the conditionality that comes together with multilateral assistance has been associated with aid volatility and unpredictability (Bulir and Hamann, 2008; Celasun and Walliser, 2008). In last years, to make the financial support to LICs more predictable, the IMF and the World Bank have worked to streamline the conditionality and the access to financial facilities for emergency and short-term support.\footnote{By contrast, the use of contingent financing instruments remains quite limited (International Monetary Fund and World Bank, 2011).} The global financial crisis has highlighted the importance of macroeconomic policies, since LICs with a sound fiscal stance, a buffer of international reserve and flexible exchange rates were able to

\footnote{Rodrik (2006) calculates that the increase in reserves occurred in the early 1990s in developing countries (where reserves reached almost 30 percent of GDP and 8 months of imports) has been translated in an income loss close to 1 percent of national GDP.}

\footnote{For instance, the IMF Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) provides low access, rapid, and highly concessional financial assistance to LICs facing an urgent balance of payments need, without the need for program-based conditionality. It can provide flexible support in a wide variety of circumstances, including shocks, natural disasters, and emergencies resulting from fragility. To deal with exogenous natural or economic shocks, the IDA Crisis Response Window (CRW) provides additional resources that will help countries to respond to severe economic crises and major natural disasters. For additional details, see the IMF and World Bank websites and International Monetary Fund and World Bank (2011).}
to dampen the effects of the crisis (Berg, Papageorgiou, Pattillo, and Spatafora, 2010). Collier and Goderis (2009b) focuses on microeconomic policies and underline how structural policies may help mitigating the negative effects of adverse shocks. In particular, they consider natural disasters and export price shocks and find that their effect is stronger when labor market regulation and firm regulation prevent an efficient re-allocation of capital and labor.

Finally, the recent evidence on developing countries shows that migrants remittances significantly increase in response to natural disasters (Yang and Choi, 2007; Yang, 2008) and reduce output volatility, especially in countries particularly exposed to food price shocks, natural disasters, fiscal shocks and financial crises (Chami, Hakura, and Montiel, 2009; Combes and Ebeke, 2011; Bettin, Presbitero, and Spatafora, 2013).

3 The role of aid as a shock absorber

The discussion so far and the picture emerging from Figure 3 would suggest that aid and remittances are two natural candidates to help countries mitigate the adverse effects of macroeconomic fluctuations. Combes, Ebeke, Etoundi, and Yogo (2014), for instance, show that aid and remittance flows mitigate the adverse effect of food price shocks on the level and instability of household consumption in vulnerable countries. In the following, we focus on foreign aid and we discuss how the stabilizing effect of foreign assistance, and its potential inclusion in a sovereign ALM strategy, could be hindered by aid procyclicality, volatility, and its unpredictability.

3.1 Aid procyclicality

In an influential paper, Pallage and Robe (2001) analyze foreign aid over the period 1969-1995 and find that the cyclical component of ODA is positively correlated with the cyclical component of domestic output in 25 out of the 35 Sub-Saharan African countries considered. Analyzing a longer dataset, Bulir and Hamann (2007, p. 730) find that the relative volatility of aid with respect to revenue increased in the early 2000s as compared with the late 1990s, and that “aid has been delivered in a mildly procyclical fashion”. The same authors conclude that “aid has failed to act either as a stabilizing force or as an insurance mechanism” (Bulir and Hamann, 2007, p. 730).

Against this framework, some recent evidences provide a more heterogeneous picture. Dabla-Norris, Minoiu, and Zanna (2014) show that, on average, aid seems procyclical, especially in middle-income countries and in response to episodes of civil wars. However, when considering large exogenous macroeconomic shocks (such as a decline in the terms of trade, growth collapses and natural disasters) aid turns out to be countercyclical. In a different setting, Collier and Goderis (2009a) find that foreign aid mitigates the effect of commodity export price shocks. In a similar vein, Guillauumont Jeanneney and Tapsoba (2012) argue that foreign aid could help stabilize income fluctuations, especially in countries heavily dependent on foreign assistance and exposed to frequent output fluctuations. This effect, however, is quite limited, especially in case of multilateral assistance, which should be more explicitly targeted at helping LICs coping with exogenous shocks. The new tools developed by the IFIs go in this direction (see Section 2.2), although a proper evaluation has not
3.2 Aid volatility

Pallage and Robe (2001) and Bulír and Hamann (2003, 2008) maintain that foreign aid to developing countries have been highly volatile and procyclical, possibly magnifying economic instability and hurting growth. Hudson and Mosley (2008) make the point that volatility depends on aid instruments, so that reactive aid – food and emergency aid and program aid – is indeed more volatile than technical assistance. In general, aid volatility has been found to depend on donors characteristics, on the concentration of the aid disbursements among a few donors, on recipient country’s governance and institutional setting and macroeconomic instability, and on frictions in the allocation process (Hudson and Mosley, 2008; Eifert and Gelb, 2008; Fielding and Mavrotas, 2008).

As showed in Figures 1 and 3, the volatility of aid does not significantly decrease over time (see also Bulír and Hamann, 2008; Hudson and Mosley, 2008), neither it is high compared to other sources of external finance (see also Frot and Santiso, 2008). However, the comparison between aid and private capital flows is not particularly meaningful, since they do not respond to the same factors, neither they are targeted to similar purposes. A better comparison is the one between aid and other sources of finance for public investment, such as government revenue. In this case, Bulír and Hamann (2007, 2008) clearly show that aid flows are much more volatile than domestic fiscal revenue.

Significant year-on-year changes could have a number of adverse consequences on macroeconomic management in recipient countries. Arellano, Bulír, Lane, and Lipschitz (2009) present and calibrate a model showing that aid volatility exacerbates macroeconomic fluctuations and generates welfare losses, especially in countries which are poorly financially integrated, since households can not borrow to insure against fluctuations and smooth consumption. The empirical evidence corroborates these predictions and suggest that aid volatility exacerbates macroeconomic instability, complicates the conduct of monetary and fiscal policies, and hinders government spending and investment, generating a negative growth dividend (see, for instance Pallage and Robe, 2003; Torsvik, 2005).

3.3 Aid unpredictability

The volatility and unpredictability of foreign aid refer to two different concepts, even if they are often considered as two faces of a same coin. Volatility is the ex-post realization of aid flows and refer to their degree of variability over time. In principle, the volatility of aid could be fully explained by the variability of the macroeconomic determinants of aid so that, as long as aid determinants

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8It is worth noting the economic effect of aid volatility. The model, calibrated on the Ivory Coast, shows that “if donors delivered aid in a stable manner, they could reduce aid by 8% while maintaining the same level of well-being for citizens of aid-receiving countries” (Arellano, Bulír, Lane, and Lipschitz, 2009, p. 95).

9For instance, Arellano, Bulír, Lane, and Lipschitz (2009, p. 87) consider the aid commitment-to-disbursements ratio as a measure of aid volatility and conclude that “Aid volatility results in substantial welfare losses, providing a motivation for recent discussions of aid architecture stressing the need for greater predictability of aid.”
can be reasonably projected, the volatility of aid flows does not necessarily generate adverse consequences for recipient governments, neither it spills over into aid ineffectiveness. By contrast, aid unpredictability can be assimilated to a shock, since countries have to deal with an (unexpected) shortage of aid disbursements with respect to donors’ commitments. This implies that volatility and unpredictability can not be used interchangeably. Specifically, it is aid unpredictability which is more likely to generate adverse consequences on recipient domestic macro policies and to undermine aid effectiveness (Celasun and Walliser, 2008).

As shown in Figure 1, aid disbursements have traditionally felt short of commitments, especially in poorer countries (Bulir and Hamann, 2008), and this could have severe adverse effects on recipient countries. Lacking access to international capital markets and buffer stocks, aid unpredictability could affect the level and the composition of government spending. In fact, when there is an unexpected drop in aid, governments are forced to postpone investment projects. By contrary, aid windfalls would boost government consumption, given that the level of government expenditure can be adjusted more easily than public investment (Celasun and Walliser, 2008). Kodama (2012) presents a model according to which unpredictability generates a significant waste of aid inflows, undermining aid effectiveness and jeopardizing growth. The results of the model are consistent with the existing evidence on the adverse effects of aid uncertainty on investment and growth (Lensink and Morrissey, 2000). Furthermore, aid unpredictability may weaken governance, being associated with more corruption. Kangoye (2013) shows that this is the case and argues that aid unpredictability could provide incentives to risk-averse politicians for rent-seeking activities, aimed at over-extracting the current rent from aid without waiting for uncertain disbursements.

3.4 Necessary conditions for aid to be a shock absorber

Foreign aid could act as a shock absorber and be part of a sovereign ALM if it were a reliable, stable and predictable source of external finance. However, the control of recipient governments over aid inflows could also be impaired, unless when they recur to IMF-supported concessional lending programs, since aid disbursements depend, among other factors, on donors’ economic conditions (Fuchs, Dreher, and Nunnenkamp, 2012). This positive correlation between aid and donors’ business cycle is one key aspect which may increase recipients’ vulnerability to external shocks. We formally test this hypothesis in the next Section.

In addition, the predictability of aid and its capacity to mitigate the vulnerability to external shocks, rather than magnifying them, can not be taken as given. Henceforth, three main questions have to be answered to understand if aid could act as a shock absorber. First, how does aid relate

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10One issue that deserves further scrutiny is the increasing role of alternative sources of foreign aid, such as non-governmental charities, private-oriented companies and private foundations. Aid channelled through these sources is supplementing official ODA and its determinants (and dependence from donors economic conditions) are not necessarily the same (Dreher, Nunnenkamp, Ohler, and Weisser, 2012). In addition, non-DAC donors are also a growing source of external assistance for developing countries, even if the evidence on the determinants of aid disbursed by new donors is not encouraging (Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele, 2011).

11In a very comprehensively review of the literature on the determinants of foreign aid, Fuchs, Dreher, and Nunnenkamp (2012) test 16 different hypotheses which could motivate aid spending. Among these, they find that few variables are robustly correlated with the aid effort. Specifically, they do not find sound evidence that the donor’s business cycle influences its effort which, instead, is quite persistent.
to other public and private sources of external finance? Second, does aid increase in response to adverse economic shocks? Third, is aid a stable and predictable source of finance? We deal with these issues in Sections 5 and 6.

4 Donors’ business cycle and aid inflows

The great recession has sparked the interest of academics and policy makers on the procyclicality of aid with respect to donors’ GDP. Dang, Knack, and Rogers (2009) show that banking crises were associated with a severe and persistent contraction of aid disbursements between 1977 and 2007. Dabla-Norris, Minoiu, and Zanna (2014) analyze bilateral flows covering the period 1970-2005 and, controlling for donor-recipient pair fixed effects, find that foreign aid is positively correlated with the output gap of donor countries. Consistently with these evidences, Gravier-Rymaszewska (2012) adopts a panel VAR approach and finds that economic crises affect aid budgets and their trend, since prolonged recessions and banking crises have a lasting and negative effect on aid supply.

4.1 The empirical exercise

Given the recent drop in aid flows following the global recession, we start the empirical analysis trying to assess to what extent aid is responsive to economic shocks in donor countries. With respect to the literature discussed above, the main novelty of the exercise is that the sample includes the recent global financial crisis. To inspect how financial crises and business cycle are correlated with the aid effort, we estimate a basic model of aid determinants for a sample of 22 OECD donor countries, over the period 1985-2010:

\[
AID/POP_{i,t} = \alpha AID/POP_{i,t-1} + \beta_1 TREND_{i,t} + \beta_2 OUTPUT GAP_{i,t} + \gamma X_{i,t} + \mu_i + \tau_t + \epsilon_{it}
\]  

where \( AID/POP_{i,t} \) is measured by per capita net ODA disbursements by donor \( i \) at time \( t \). The standard set of explanatory variables includes the lagged value of net ODA disbursements per capita, to deal with the inertia of aid flows, and real GDP, which is decomposed in the potential output (\( TREND \)) and the output gap (\( OUTPUT GAP \)). The coefficient \( \beta_2 \) measures the impact of donors’ business cycle on aid flows (Dabla-Norris, Minoiu, and Zanna, 2014). To better gauge the impact of economic adverse shocks in donor countries on aid flows, we follow Dang, Knack, and Rogers (2009) and Frot (2009) and include in the model also a dummy for the presence of a banking crisis. To assess the robustness of the estimation of \( \beta_2 \), we augment the basic model with a set of

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12 The donor countries included in the analysis are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States.

13 The definition of the dependent variable is not straightforward (see Fuchs, Dreher, and Nunnenkamp, 2012, Appendix C). In defining \( AID \) two main issues arise. First, aid can be measured in terms of ODA disbursements and commitments, and of net and gross flows. In the baseline model, we use net aid disbursements. The second issue has to do with the normalization of the aid variable. The literature generally measures the aid effort scaling ODA by country economic size. However, since in this exercise we are interested in the correlation between aid and economic conditions, we normalize aid by population, in order to avoid any mechanical correlation between the dependent variable and out key explanatory variable \( OUTPUT GAP \).
additional control variables ($X_{it}$): the logarithm of population, which accounts for the possibility that country size matters for generosity, the current account and fiscal balances, and the degree of openness. Finally, the model includes also country ($\mu_i$) and year ($\tau_t$) fixed effects, while $\varepsilon_{it}$ is the spherical error term.

We estimate equation 1 using the Fixed-Effect (FE) estimator, in order to wash out any time-invariant country fixed effect $\mu_i$ which could influence aid generosity. Given the persistence nature of aid flows, we allow for autocorrelation in the error term using the Newey and West (1987) standard errors.

The main data sources are the OECD DAC data set for aid variables and the OECD Economic Outlook for macroeconomic data. Other data comes from the Penn World Tables (Version 7.1) and from other data sets. Variable definitions, summary statistics and sources are listed in Table 4.

4.2 Results

Before turning to the regression results, we provide some descriptive evidence of the correlation between foreign aid and donors’ economic conditions. Figure 4 plots the evolution of net ODA disbursements and of the output gap for six of the main donors. No clear pattern emerges. While the correlation is positive and large for Japan (0.40), it is large and negative for France (-0.35) and the United States (-0.21), smaller for Germany (-0.15) and closer to zero for the other countries. This result, however, is partially driven by the global financial crisis. The diagrams clearly show the decline in the output gap, which has not been matched by an equally significant drop in aid assistance. In fact, the same correlations, excluding the post-2007 years, are positive and large for all donors but France. Hence, this first preliminary finding suggests a weak correlation between aid and donors’ business cycle. The diagrams identify also the years in which there was a banking crisis. In this case, again, we see a significant drop in the output gap, as expected, but not a similar decline in aid flows.

To better investigate the possible effects of banking crises on aid disbursements, Figure 5 plots the evolution of net ODA disbursements in a three-year window before and after the crisis year, for the whole sample of 23 donor countries. In this case, the diagram suggests a different picture. Official aid, in fact, is somewhat lower in the three-year period after the crisis than before and it does not seem to bounce back to the pre-crisis level. By contrast, aid commitments show a much steeper decline the year after the banking crisis, but they soon came back to the pre-crisis level. This would suggest that donors actually shrink their aid budget in response to a banking crisis more than they actually communicate through their pledges.

The results of the estimation of equation 1 are reported in Table 1. The baseline specification (column 1) shows that aid disbursements per capita are highly persistent (the autoregressive term is equal to 0.86) and that they are influenced by the donors’ business cycle. In fact, while per capita aid flows are not significantly associated with potential GDP, they respond positively to the evolution of the output gap. In column 2 we replace OUTPUT GAP with a dummy for the occurrence of a banking crisis, finding that the latter is negatively correlated with AID/POP. When these two proxies of economic conditions in donor countries are jointly included in the regression, they are
still statistically significant (column 3). This main result holds even controlling for other possible determinants of the donors’ aid allocations. However, we do not find evidence that country size, current account, fiscal balance and openness significantly affect per capita aid disbursements.

The estimated coefficients indicate that the economic impact of adverse shocks in donor countries have a sizable impact on aid flows. In banking crisis years, per capita aid disbursements are about 11-12 USD less than in non-crisis years. Considering that the average value of $AID/POP$ is 189 dollars per capita, this translates into a reduction of 6.1 percent. By contrast, the economic effect of $OUTPUT\ GAP$ is much smaller: a contraction of GDP of one percentage points below its potential is associated with about one dollar per capita less in aid disbursements. Considering the coefficients reported in column 3, the joint effect of a banking crisis and of a three percentage point contraction of GDP below the trend are associated with a 7.1 percent reduction of per capita aid disbursements.

Notes: Elaboration on data from OECD and Laeven and Valencia (2012).
5 Aid, shocks, and other capital inflows

5.1 The empirical exercise

Having assessed to what extent aid flows are responsive to donors’ business conditions, we now turn to the correlations between aid, recipient economic conditions, and other capital flows to LDCs.

First, we focus on the relationship between aid and international remittances, foreign direct investment, and debt service flows, in order to ascertain if aid is positively or negatively correlated with other sources of external finance. On the aggregate, Figure 3 would suggest that aid is a stable source of external finance, less prone to the volatile conditions which affect debt and investment flows.

Second, we try to measure the degree of procyclicality of aid, looking at its correlation with GDP growth and terms of trade, as a measure of external shocks. This is a key aspect to understand the potential stabilization role of foreign assistance and its effectiveness, but is also an issue on which the literature is quite inconclusive (see Section 3.1).

In the following, we test these hypotheses looking at a panel of 62 low income and lower middle income aid recipient observed between 1975 and 2010.14 To test the cyclicality of aid, we look at

Notes: Elaboration on data from OECD and Laeven and Valencia (2012).
## Table 1: Aid and the donors’ business cycle: net disbursements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dep. var.: AID/POP</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AID/POP(_{-1})</td>
<td>0.862***</td>
<td>0.871***</td>
<td>0.867***</td>
<td>0.866***</td>
<td>0.863***</td>
<td>0.846***</td>
<td>0.860***</td>
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<td>[0.028]</td>
<td>[0.028]</td>
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<td>18.231</td>
<td>16.882</td>
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<td>[12.986]</td>
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<td>0.895**</td>
<td>0.862**</td>
<td>0.999**</td>
<td>1.023***</td>
<td>0.855*</td>
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<td>[0.426]</td>
<td>[0.429]</td>
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<td>[5.137]</td>
<td>[5.085]</td>
<td>[5.143]</td>
<td>[5.347]</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>[0.180]</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Observations</td>
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<td>518</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** The dependent variable is the log of net aid disbursements. The table reports the regression coefficients and, in brackets, the associated Newey-West standard errors (errors have an AR(4) structure). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. A constant and year dummies are included.

its correlation with the GDP growth rate of recipient countries, which is taken as proxy of business cycle\(^{15}\), and the evolution of the terms of trade, taken as a proxy for shocks (this indicator has the advantage, with respect to output gap, of being exogenous to aid allocations). Thus, we estimate the following model:

\[
AID/GDP_{jt} = \alpha AID/GDP_{jt-1} + \beta_1 REM_{jt} + \beta_2 FDI_{jt} + \beta_3 TDS_{jt} + \\
+ \gamma_1 GROWTH_{jt} + \gamma_2 TOT_{jt} + \delta' X_{jt} + \mu_j + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{jt} \tag{2}
\]

in which aid inflows (\(AID/GDP\)) to country \(j\) at time \(t\) is a function of: (i) the past level of aid, (ii) a set of standard controls (\(X_{jt}\)) including the log of population and the logarithm of real per capita GDP, (iii) the three other sources of capital flows, and (iv) the two measures of output shocks, per capita real GDP growth (\(GROWTH\)) and the logarithm of the terms of trade (\(TOT\)).

In particular, we test – separately and jointly – the simultaneous correlation between aid and remittances (\(REM\)), foreign direct investment (\(FDI\)) and debt service payments (\(TDS\)). Given that the three key explanatory variables are all scaled by GDP and that, in this case, we are less concerned with the correlation between aid flows and GDP, we measure aid inflows as the ratio of

\(^{15}\)We acknowledge that per capita GDP growth rate is not the best measure of business cycle. However, we have not the same data on trend and output gap as the ones for advanced economies used in Table 1. In addition, filtering the GDP series may lead to serious measurement errors because of limited time series for several countries.
Table 2: Aid, capital inflows and shocks in LDCs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dep. var.: $AID/GDP$</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$AID/GDP_{t−1}$</td>
<td>0.626***</td>
<td>0.617***</td>
<td>0.623***</td>
<td>0.626***</td>
<td>0.624***</td>
<td>0.612***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.033]</td>
<td>[0.029]</td>
<td>[0.033]</td>
<td>[0.032]</td>
<td>[0.033]</td>
<td>[0.030]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[3.174]</td>
<td>[2.579]</td>
<td>[3.041]</td>
<td>[3.156]</td>
<td>[3.176]</td>
<td>[2.353]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$GDP − PC$</td>
<td>-4.469***</td>
<td>-4.281***</td>
<td>-4.572***</td>
<td>-4.342***</td>
<td>-4.496***</td>
<td>-4.329***</td>
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<td>[1.268]</td>
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<td>[1.245]</td>
<td>[1.257]</td>
<td>[1.267]</td>
<td>[1.215]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$GROWTH$</td>
<td>-0.040</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>[0.034]</td>
<td>[0.034]</td>
<td>[0.035]</td>
<td>[0.035]</td>
<td>[0.034]</td>
<td>[0.036]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$REM$</td>
<td>0.079***</td>
<td>0.078***</td>
<td>0.079***</td>
<td>0.034**</td>
<td>0.039***</td>
<td>0.039***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.029]</td>
<td>[0.029]</td>
<td>[0.029]</td>
<td>[0.014]</td>
<td>[0.013]</td>
<td>[0.013]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$TDS$</td>
<td>0.034**</td>
<td>0.034**</td>
<td>0.034**</td>
<td>-0.080**</td>
<td>-0.063**</td>
<td>-0.063**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.014]</td>
<td>[0.014]</td>
<td>[0.014]</td>
<td>[0.036]</td>
<td>[0.028]</td>
<td>[0.028]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$FDI$</td>
<td>-0.003**</td>
<td>-0.003**</td>
<td>-0.003**</td>
<td>-0.003**</td>
<td>-0.003**</td>
<td>-0.003**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.001]</td>
<td>[0.001]</td>
<td>[0.001]</td>
<td>[0.001]</td>
<td>[0.001]</td>
<td>[0.001]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations    | 1,494 | 1,494 | 1,494 | 1,494 | 1,494 | 1,494 |
$R^2$            | 0.660 | 0.663 | 0.662 | 0.662 | 0.661 | 0.667 |
Number of recipients | 62   | 62   | 62   | 62   | 62   | 62   |

Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of net aid disbursements over GDP. The table reports the regression coefficients and, in brackets, the associated robust standard errors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. A constant and year dummies are included.

net ODA disbursements over GDP. As in equation 1, $\mu_j$ is the country-fixed effect, $\tau_t$ are the time dummies and $\varepsilon_{jt}$ is the error term. To wash out individual effects, equation 2 is estimated with the within-group estimator. A description of the variable is in Table 4 in the Appendix, while results are presented in Table 2.

5.2 Results

The baseline model (column 1) shows that aid inflows are quite persistent – the autoregressive term is equal to 0.62 – and they are economically targeted since higher flows in terms of national GDP go to poorer countries. The coefficient on GDP growth is negative, but statistically not significant. This is not surprising, given the contrasting findings discussed in the literature. The coefficient of recipient population, instead, is not significant, indicating that there is no scale effect, in line with what found by Dabla-Norris, Minoiu, and Zanna (2014) on a sample of LICs.

Moving to columns 2-4, we see that aid is significantly correlated with other capital inflows in a way that help stabilizing their fluctuations. First, we see that aid is positively associated with remittances and debt service, while it is negatively associated with FDI. Hence, aid increases when foreign direct investment decreases and when countries face higher debt service payments, consistently with the evidence of defensive granting showed by Marchesi and Missale (2013) in a

16Given that some of the explanatory variables are likely to suffer from measurement errors, we show regression results excluding outliers, as identified by the leverage-versus-squared-residual plot.
sample of developing countries. Again, even controlling for time and country fixed effects, we find that aid and remittances go along and they act as a counterbalancing mechanism to more volatile FDI and to debt service. In column 5 we focus on the potential role of aid as a stabilizer of external shocks and we find that, other than being negatively correlated with economic growth (albeit not significantly), it is also negatively and significantly associated with the terms of trade. Consistent with what found by Collier and Goderis (2009a), our results show that countries dealing with a negative shock on export prices are more likely to receive larger aid flows. Finally, in column 6 we control for all these additional variables jointly and we find that the correlations remain statistically significant and the size of the coefficients is almost unaffected.

On the whole, the results reported in Table 2 point out that aid is targeted to poorer countries and actively play a stabilization role. It generally increases as long as countries face an adverse shock and it is negatively correlated to more volatile capital flows.

6 Aid unpredictability

6.1 The empirical exercise

As discussed in Section 3.3, aid unpredictability – more than its volatility – has severe macroeconomic consequences for recipient countries. Therefore, we now look at the factors associated with predictable aid flows. The most common way to measure predictability is comparing OECD-DAC data on aid disbursements and commitments, as reported in Figure 1.\footnote{The OECD publishes data on Country Programmable Aid (CPA), defined as gross ODA minus humanitarian aid, debt relief, aid that does not entail cross border flows, and aid that is not part of a cooperation agreement before governments. The resulting aid flows generally involve multi-year forward expenditure plans by donors. According to this definition, CPA was equal to USD 93 billion in 2011 and declined by 2.1\% with respect to 2010, notwithstanding the donors’ agreement to try to offset the effect of the global crisis on developing countries (OECD, 2012).}

Before inspecting in greater detail the factors associated with the discrepancy between commitments and disbursements, we try to have a sense of aid predictability in our sample of recipient countries adopting a different approach. We take advantage of the empirical exercise run in the previous section to compare out-of-sample predictions with the actual aid disbursements to developing countries. Specifically, we re-estimate equation 2 over the period 1975-2005 and we predict the country specific level of aid for the years 2006-2010. The predictions are plotted in Figure 6 against actual aid disbursements. The diagram clearly outlines the magnitude of the forecasting error. In fact, the absolute difference between the predicted and actual aid-to-GDP ratios ranges from 0 to 16.8\% percent, with a median equal to 3.8\% percent and one forth of forecast values which are 6 percentage points higher (or lower) than real aid flows. A second interesting issue is that there is a negative – but weak – correlation between the magnitude of the deviation of predicted from actual aid flows and the per capita GDP of recipient countries.\footnote{The correlation between the difference between the predicted aid and the actual aid to GDP ratio and the per capita real GDP is equal to -0.22 (-0.11 if GDP is measured in purchasing power parity).} Hence, poorer countries seems to be less exposed to aid unpredictability, a fact that we will test more formally in the following exercise.

Given the importance of aid unpredictability, we try to identify which macroeconomic and
institutional characteristics are more likely to be associated with less predictable aid flows. Hence, we estimate a simple equation in which the ratio of the difference between aid commitments and disbursements over GDP \( \frac{(COMM - DISB)}{GDP} \) is a function of its lagged value and a set of potential drivers (\(X\)):

\[
\left[ \frac{(COMM - DISB)}{GDP} \right]_{j,t} = \alpha \left[ \frac{(COMM - DISB)}{GDP} \right]_{j,t-1} + \beta' X_{j,t} + \mu_j + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{jt} \tag{3}
\]

where \(j\) refers to the recipient country, \(\mu_j\) is the country-fixed effect, \(\tau_t\) are the time dummies and \(\varepsilon_{jt}\) is the error term. In the baseline specification, the vector \(X\) includes country size, per capita GDP, output growth, and the share of aid commitments over GDP. This simple set of variables has been chosen in order to identify which country characteristics are good predictors of the exposition to aid unpredictability. As in the previous models, we wash out individual effects estimating equation 3 with the within-group estimator. The sample includes a maximum of 70 recipient countries over the period 1975-2010. Results are reported in Table 3, while variables’ definition is in Table 4.

The sample of low and lower middle income countries include: Angola, Armenia, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Rep., Chad, Comoros, Congo Dem. Rep., Congo Rep., Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Laos, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal,
Table 3: Determinants of aid unpredictability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dep. Var.: $\frac{(COMM - DISB)}{GDP}$</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\frac{(COMM - DISB)}{GDP}_{t-1}$</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.052]</td>
<td>[0.056]</td>
<td>[0.052]</td>
<td>[0.051]</td>
<td>[0.054]</td>
<td>[0.055]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$COMM/GDP$</td>
<td>0.432***</td>
<td>0.430***</td>
<td>0.439***</td>
<td>0.436***</td>
<td>0.434***</td>
<td>0.442***</td>
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<td>[0.028]</td>
<td>[0.031]</td>
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<td>[4.145]</td>
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<td>$GDP - PC$</td>
<td>4.757***</td>
<td>5.156***</td>
<td>5.196***</td>
<td>4.842***</td>
<td>5.069***</td>
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<td>-0.039</td>
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<td>-0.017</td>
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<td>$TOT$</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[0.047]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>2,159</td>
<td>2,194</td>
<td>2,095</td>
<td>1,949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.485</td>
<td>0.472</td>
<td>0.486</td>
<td>0.487</td>
<td>0.474</td>
<td>0.477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of recipients</td>
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<td>66</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of the difference between aid commitments and disbursements over GDP. The table reports the regression coefficients and, in brackets, the associated robust standard errors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. A constant and year dummies are included.

6.2 Results

The estimates of equation 3 point out some interesting patterns. We start discussing the baseline specification reported in column 1 of Table 3. First, the lagged value of the dependent variable has a negative small and not significant coefficient, suggesting that the deviation of commitments from disbursements is actually a shock which does not have any persistence over time. This an interesting results corroborating the vulnerability of poor countries to external conditions. Second, the degree of aid unpredictability is higher for countries which have a higher share of aid commitments over GDP, so that major aid recipients are also the ones which have to deal more frequently with unpredictable flows. Third, other things equal, larger and richer countries are more likely to experience larger deviations of commitments from disbursements. This finding is consistent with the descriptive evidence of out-of-sample predictions (even if the two exercise use two complete different measures of aid unpredictability) and indicates that small and poor states, which are generally the most vulnerable ones, are, at least, less exposed to unexpected variations in aid inflows. Finally, the coefficient on $GROWTH$ is negative, but not statistically significant, and indicates

that unpredictability is not an additional source of vulnerability for slow-growing countries.

In columns 2-6 we test the robustness of our main findings. The main result is the evidence of a positive correlation between terms of trade and aid unpredictability. Consistently with the finding on country size and per capita GDP, the results reported in column 2 indicate that the vulnerability due to aid unpredictability does not add to other existing country vulnerabilities. The other columns show that there is no statistical association between indebtedness, openness, financial sector development and governance, and the deviation of aid commitments from disbursements.

Finally, the estimates report a significant and interesting pattern of aid unpredictability over time. Each regression includes time dummies which, however, are not reported in Table 3. To see the effect of time on the dependent variable, in Figure 7 we plot the yearly averages of the deviation of aid commitments from disbursements over GDP, conditional on the set of explanatory variables used in the preferred specification of column 2. From the diagram it is interesting to note that aid unpredictability has been a severe problem for all over the 1980s and the early 1990s. Its importance remarkably declined in the mid-1990s, while it gained again momentum since 2004. This pattern is consistent with the descriptive evidence of Figure 1 and justifies the renewed

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Notes: calculations based on Table 3, column 2. Equation 3 is estimated using the standard set of control variables, excluding time dummies. The figure plots the yearly averages of predicted values across countries.

To be more precise, we estimate equation 3, controlling also for terms of trade (TOT) other than for the vector $X$, but excluding time dummies. Then, we retrieve the predicted values of $(COMM - DISB)/GDP$. As a third step, we take the average of these predictions in each year and we plot the averages over time.
attention by policy-makers on aid predictability.21

7 Concluding remarks

For aid to contribute to risks mitigation, it should be expected and reliable. On the aggregate, the evidence presented in the previous sections consistently shows that aid disbursements are relatively stable (aid is strongly path dependent), at least compared with other capital flows, and they are positively (negatively) correlated with debt service (FDI). The potential role of aid as a shock absorber is further confirmed by the fact that aid increases in years when countries suffer adverse economic shocks (Table 2). Nevertheless, there are at least two sources of concern. First, aid flows contract in response to economic shocks in donor countries, even if the magnitude of the effect is not that strong. This limits the control of recipients on foreign aid and contributes to its volatility. Second, aid is not always predictable and, in some circumstances, actual aid disbursements fall far short from expectations. While this may be obvious for some kind of aid (i.e. emergency aid), aid unpredictability may have adverse effect on long-run investment projects.

Hence, a first step on which the donor community and multilaterals should engage is increasing their efforts to make aid more predictable and less dependent on donors’ business cycle. As regard the first issue, at the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra in 2008, donors committed to “provide developing countries with regular and timely information on their rolling three- to five-year forward expenditure and/or implementation plans, with at least indicative resource allocations that developing countries can integrate in their medium-term planning and macroeconomic framework”. Against this background, the OECD has different projects aimed at fostering aid transparency and predictability, mainly through the Survey on Donors’ Forward Spending Plans and the publication of data on country programmable aid (OECD, 2012).

More broadly, a reform of the aid allocation framework could increase predictability, especially if aimed at increasing the share of CPA in total ODA (i.e. raising project aid) and if conditionalities and eligibility criteria are related to slow-moving indicators rather than to annual (and volatile) economic and institutional indicators. As for the second issue, bilateral donors could think of building buffer stocks in their budget for aid assistance, to rely on during times of adverse economic conditions. While this strategy may make sense, it is politically unfeasible, especially during recessions when there are several conflicting requests for scarce domestic resources. A more viable solution would be a further shift from bilateral to multilateral aid, given that multilaterals should be less responsive to external economic conditions.

On the recipient side, the critical policy discussion is how to cope with unstable and unpredictable aid flows. Given that the command of recipient government on foreign aid is partially impaired, country authorities should adopt active strategies to smooth as much as possible aid inflows. A possible strategy would involve reserve management. Over the past years several LICs accumulated reserves for precautionary purposes, mainly to deal with balance-of-payments crises (see Section 2.2).

21See, for instance, the Accra agenda for action, following the 2008 Accra Forum on aid effectiveness.
A possible suggestion is that, in a sovereign ALM framework, governments could actively manage international reserves as a stabilization tool, raising them during aid surges, implying that aid is not absorbed neither spent (Hussain, Berg, and Aiyar, 2009), and reducing them when aid unexpectedly falls below a certain level. Practically, this kind of strategy would require the definition of a (time-varying) desired level of aid, which should be envisaged in a realistic way and keeping into account the government financing needs over the medium-term. Thus, aid and reserves would jointly balance each others working as an insurance tool. In this framework, aid is saved for future years when it is above a given threshold, through reserve accumulation, while reserves will step-in when aid will fall short of its expected value.

Given the long-lasting relevance of foreign aid in the government budget of several LICs, it may be possible, when certain conditions are met, to consider aid inflows as an asset that could be a part of a sovereign ALM. Including aid in a more general framework, which should help coordinating monetary and fiscal policies and managing risks, would also have a direct impact on aid effectiveness, since aid would be targeted to the right destinations, according to country needs. For instance, for countries extremely vulnerable to external conditions, aid flows – at least part of the Country Programmable Aid – if actively connected with reserve management, may be considered as a shock absorber. This would spill over into additional and much-needed public investment in infrastructures. Moreover, for relatively richer and stable countries a predictable stream of foreign aid could be a better source of financing than government revenues for long-term poverty-reduction projects and to cover contingent liabilities related to guarantee schemes or welfare programs.

\footnote{This represent a novelty. For instance, in the extensive discussion of the sovereign ALM proposed by Das, Lu, Papaioannou, and Petrova (2012), the word ‘aid’ is never used.}
References


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## Additional Tables

### Table 4: Variables: definition and sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AID/POP</td>
<td>Per capita net aid disbursements</td>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AID/GDP</td>
<td>Net aid disbursements over GDP</td>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TREND</td>
<td>Logarithm of potential GDP</td>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUTPUT GAP</td>
<td>Deviations of actual GDP from potential GDP as % of potential GDP</td>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BANKING CRISIS</td>
<td>Dummy equal to one for country-year observations in which there is a systemic banking crisis, and zero otherwise</td>
<td>Laeven and Valencia (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POP</td>
<td>Logarithm of population</td>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAB</td>
<td>Current account balance, as a percentage of GDP</td>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NET LENDING</td>
<td>Cyclically adjusted government net lending, as a percentage of potential GDP</td>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPENNESS</td>
<td>Exports plus imports over GDP at 2005 constant prices</td>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP – PC</td>
<td>Logarithm of GDP per capita (constant 2000 USD)</td>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GROWTH</td>
<td>Real GDP per capita growth (annual % change)</td>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REM</td>
<td>Remittance inflows over GDP</td>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDS</td>
<td>Total debt service (% of exports of goods, services and income)</td>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign direct investment over GDP</td>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOT</td>
<td>Terms of trade, total</td>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(COMM – DISB)/GDP</td>
<td>ODA commitments minus disbursements over GDP</td>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMM/GDP</td>
<td>ODA commitments over GDP</td>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEBT</td>
<td>Logarithm of (1 +) total external debt over GDP</td>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M2/GDP</td>
<td>Money and quasi money (M2) over GDP</td>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLITY SCORE</td>
<td>Polity score, based on six measures that record key qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and political competition. The index is part of the Polity IV project and ranges from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy)</td>
<td>Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers (2010) and Teorell, Charron, Samanni, Holmberg, and Rothstein (2011)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>