THE IMPACT OF INEQUALITY ON COOPERATION: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the impact of inequality in the distribution of endowments on contributions. We conduct a lab experiment using the well-known Public Good Game to test the relation between inequality and contribution to a public fund. We introduce the possibility to choose among three different redistribution rules: equidistribution, proportional to contribution and progressive to endowment. This novelty, combined with a payoff function that depends also on previous period behavior, allows us to verify the hypothesis that players show inequity averse preferences. Results show that inequality has a negative impact on individual contribution. Since inequality is decreasing during repetitions, we deduce that players show inequity averse preferences.

JEL Class.: D7, H41, C9
Keywords: Reciprocity, Public Good Game, Inequality

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The Impact of Inequality on Cooperation: An Experimental Study*

Annarita Colasante & Alberto Russo

1 Introduction

The relation between inequality and economic growth is one of the most debated arguments in macroeconomics. Empirical evidence shows that inequality has a negative impact on various economic and social indicators. At the micro level, one of the possible explanations is that inequality reduces the individual propensity to cooperate.

In the field of Experimental Economics, one of the main tools to study this kind of relation is the so-called Public Good Game. Players at the beginning of the game are divided into groups, usually of 4 people, and each player interacts only with other players who belong to the same group. In the first stage, each agent decides how to split up the endowment between private and public account. The public good is the sum of players’ contributions of the same group multiplied by the efficiency factor. In the second stage, the public good is equally split between participants. In the next section, we explain the Public Good Game in detail and the related literature.

We conduct an experiment using a variation of this standard game. As already proposed in Buckley and Croson (2006), we introduce inequality in the initial endowments within group. This means that players in the same group receive different initial endowments. Using this approach we test the impact of inequality on the contribution to public good. Our setting introduces an important novelty with respect to the existing literature on inequality in the public good (see for example Cherry et al. (2005) and Chan et al. (1999)). We introduce the possibility to choose among different distribution rules. In the standard game the amount of the public good is equally split in the group. We propose three different rules: equidistribution, proportional to contribution and progressive to endowment. Moreover, we allow the accumulation of

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*We wish to thank the technical staff, especially Daniele Ripanti. We are grateful to Matteo Picchio for helpful suggestions.
wealth during repetitions, that is the endowment at time $t$ is the sum of the exogenous endowment and the share of public good earned in the previous period.

In this work we are interesting in the micro level analysis of other-regarding preferences, focusing on reciprocity and inequity aversion. As in Fehr and Gatcher (2000), reciprocity is a conditional form of kindness, that is kind behavior is conditioned by other kind behavior. Fehr and Schmidt (2006) define the inequity aversion as a conditional form of altruism, that is the utility of an agent who shows this kind of preferences increases if the distribution of payoff become more equitable. We expect that players take into account not only their personal payoff but also the payoff of others in the same group. This implies that, especially in the treatment with high inequality, players increase contribution to the public good in order to reduce the endowment heterogeneity.

In Section 2, we explain in more detail the standard Public Good Game and the literature about inequality and cooperation. In Section 3, we describe the experimental setting. Experimental results are summarized in Section 4 and Section 5.

## 2 Public Good Game

One of the most known game used to test the cooperative behavior in Experimental Economic is the Public Good Game (PGG). This kind of game was firstly introduced by Marwell and Ames (1981) and the repeated game with Voluntary Contribution Mechanism was proposed by Isaac et al. (1984). In this setting, subjects are divided into groups of four and play the same game for a finite number of periods. At the beginning of each period, every participant receives an endowment (usually in experimental currency) and she decides how to split this amount between private account and a group project. In the standard linear PGG each player faces the following problem:

$$\max \; \pi_i = x_i + \alpha G$$

subject to

$$\omega_i = x_i + g_i$$

$$g_i \geq 0 \quad \alpha > 0$$

where $x_i$ is the share of endowment allocated to the private consumption, $\alpha = \frac{1}{n}$ is the Marginal Per Capita Return (MPCR) ($n$ is the number of components per group), $G = \delta \sum_{i=1}^{n} g_i$ is the sum of the contributions to public good of the subjects who belong to the same group and $\delta$ is the efficiency factor ($1 < \delta < n$). Under the assumption $0 < \alpha < 1/n$, the conventional
model predicts no provision of public good with voluntary contribution mechanism. The control variable is the individual contribution $g_i$, and, in turn, the private consumption $x_i$.

The conventional public good environment is parametrized to create a social dilemma. As in Balliet (2010), this means that agents face a trade-off between personal and group interest. The best individual choice is to free ride, that is contribute nothing to public project, and this choice implies that the group take the worst possible outcome. On the other hand, to reach the best group outcome, the best choice is to put all the endowment in the group project.

According to the prediction of the standard theory and in particular to Samuelson (1954), the public good will not be provided. This is due to the fact that each agent will follow the selfish strategy of free riding.

In the last decade, many economists have focused their attention on the subjects’ behavior in the setting of PGG. The evidence shows that people usually contribute with a positive amount. In particular the main stylized facts are:

1. in the first period people usually put in the public good about half of their endowment;

2. in the repeated game the contribution decreases over time but remains always greater than zero;

3. usually an increase in MCPR brought to higher level of contribution and, in general, there are specific parameters of the economic environment that may influence the contribution.

The first result, that is players give up half of the endowment in the first period, depends on the fact that they have no information about the strategy of others player. From the second period, players change the level of contributions according to the gathered information and usually the level of contribution goes to zero which is the Nash equilibrium. Researchers use experimental evidence to look for an explanation of these phenomena. The first explanation for the observed decline in contribution is the so called learning effect. According to this point of view, participants are not able to understand immediately the incentive of the game but they need repetitions to learn that the best individual strategy is to free ride. Another possible explanation for individual behavior in this game is the strategy hypothesis, that is players know that the best strategy is to cooperate in the early periods and free ride at the end of the game. Cooperation at the beginning of the game is useful to construct a reciprocity relation in the group and so, in turn,
this relation increase the group contribution. Andreoni (1988) conducted a lab experiment with the aim to compare contributions of groups paired with stranger matching with contributions of players grouped according to the partner matching. Moreover, there is a non announced restart of the game. Results show that both learning effect and strategy hypothesis fail to predict individual behavior. Indeed, the level of contribution is higher in the specification with stranger matching than that with partner matching. In the first period after the restart of the game, players contribute with the 50% of their endowment.

The reason that brought players to put always a positive amount in the public project may be based on the fact that players show other-regarding preferences. The first contribution in this field was due to Andreoni (1990), who suggested that people gain utility from the simple act of giving, and so that the utility function might depend also on the payoff of other people. The results in Fischbacher and Gachter (2010), Croson (2007) and Fisman et al. (2007), confirm the finding of individual preference for giving.

The aim of this work is to investigate if agents behave driven by other-regarding preferences in a context with a certain degree of inequality. The growing literature regarding the effect of inequality on contribution to public good is very heterogeneous both in experimental setting and results. This means that there is no clear evidence about the impact of inequality on cooperation. The pioneer work in this field is by Rapoport and Suleiman (1993) who give heterogeneous endowment to players. The main finding is that groups with heterogeneous endowments are less cooperative with respect to the control group with homogeneous endowment.

Anderson et al. (2008) analyze results of a PGG in which the source of inequality is different fixed payment, that is different show-up fees. They propose an experiment with imperfect information, that is only half of the participants know the exact distribution of fixed payment while the other half is able to see only their own payment. The results is that contributions in the treatment with heterogeneous show-up fees are lower than those in the egalitarian treatment when players have perfect information.

Cherry et al. (2005) obtain the same result. They use a standard PGG in order to test both the impact of inequality and the origin of endowment on contribution. In the treatment with unearded endowment players receive randomly different amounts, while in the earning treatment the inequality depends on the ability of subjects. This is interesting because take into

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1In the experimental economics, Partner matching means that people interact with the same subjects during all the game. On the other hand, in the Stranger matching, groups composition change in each period.
account the different willingness to give up a share of earned endowment or a windfall endowment. Results show that players in groups with high inequality contribute less than those in the other groups and they find no significant effect of the origin of endowment.

In addition to these papers, other works find a negative correlation between heterogeneous “income” and the contribution to public good. Among them, Hofmeyr et al. (2007) investigate the impact on endowment inequality using a sample of childrens. Cardenas (2003) have conducted a field experiment considering forest as a public good. Fisher et al. (1995) consider heterogeneous MPCR within groups. On the other hand, some experimental results show the inverse relation between inequality and contributions, that is the higher the inequality, the higher the contributions. Chan et al. (1999) analyze the inequality in terms of endowment and in term of preferences. They show that both kind of inequality has a positive effect on contributions. Burns and Visser (2008) confirm the positive relation between inequality in the endowment distribution between groups and contribution. They conduct a field experiment using a sample of individuals from fishing community. An interesting approach is those of Georgantzís and Proestakis (2011) which investigates the impact of inequality after the collection of information about players’ real wealth. This approach is useful to understand how players “weight” the lab-income, i.e. the endowment, with respect to the real out-of-lab income. In this setting information about real income are gathered using a pre-experiment questionnaire. Results show that the behavior of players with high real income is significant different from the behavior of players with low income when they face the same situation, in particular, high endowments lead to higher contribution only if players have high out-of-lab wealth.

3 Focus of the experiment: target and design

We use a laboratory experiment in order to analyze the relation between inequality in the endowment distribution within groups and the contribution to public good. Using experimental setting we are able to analyze the impact of heterogeneous endowment on contributions in a controlled environment and so to understand the causal relation between these variables. Moreover, using experimental results we are able to analyze if players show other regarding preferences.

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1For example, Cherry and Shogren (2008) show that in the Dictator Game players behave selfish in the case of earned endowment.
We conduct an experiment using a variation of the well known PGG with Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM). We propose a setting which is a mixture between the pure PGG and an investment game. The main differences with the standard game are:

- communication in the group is allowed;
- voting for the distribution rule;
- initial endowment changes according choice of the previous period.

Players are randomly divided in group of five and they receive the initial endowment $d_i$. After the allocation of the amount $d_i$ between private consumption ($x_i$) and the contribution to public good ($g_i$) they see the total amount of the public fund, that is $G = \delta \sum_{i=1}^{n} g_i$ and we set $\delta = 2$. In the next stage of the game they enter anonymously in a chat group in order to find an agreement about the best way to split the public fund. They have three minutes to chat and we recommend and control that the communication is useful only for this purpose. At a later stage, they vote and the public good is split according to the rule which receive the majority of votes (that is at least 3 votes). The initial endowment of the next period is given by the exogenous amount $d_i$ and the share of public good earned in the previous period. The possibility to choose among different rules and the accumulation of wealth during repetitions are useful to observe the endogenous formation of inequality.

Communication in the PGG was firstly introduced in the setting proposed by Isaac and Walker (1988, 1991). In their work they investigate the impact of face-to-face communication on cooperation. They find that this kind of communication significantly increase the level of contributions. Bochet et al. (2006) compare the effect of face-to-face communication with respect to computer mediated communication. Experimental results show that both kind of communication have a positive effect on contribution, but the positive effect is stronger in the face-to-face procedure. See Bicchieri and Lev-On (2007) for a review about communication in social dilemmas. In our setting communication is essential to find an agreement in the group about the redistribution rule. In each session, players have three minutes to talk in a group chat about the proposed rules. Group message flow was monitored to ensure that they not reveal to others their identity. We do not test explicitly the impact of communication on contributions, because in our setting in each treatment there is the same conditions.

In the standard PGG the redistribution rule is known at the beginning of the game. In this setting the total amount is split equally among components
of the group. The possibility to choose how to divide the public good is a novelty in this field. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the unique which includes the possibility to decide on different specific rules. The paper by Balafoutas et al. (2013) propose a similar approach. In their setting, participants in PGG game choose the share of public good that will be split proportional to the individual contribution and so the share that will be split according to the equidistribution rule. We introduce the possibility to vote in order to understand if players with different endowment are able to find an agreement. In other words, we are interested in the interaction of different “social classes”, i.e. rich and poor players, especially in the case of high inequality. As we will see, the choice of specific rules is profitable for some players and detrimental for others. So, for example, rich players should convince poor players to vote for the more profitable rule for them or vice versa. The rules are:

1. **Equidistribution**: the sum of the contributions of the group is divided equally among the components, that is each subject takes $1/n(\phi \sum_{i=1}^{n} g_i)$;

2. **Proportional to contribution**: the higher the contribution the higher the share, that is the subject which contributes more will take a larger part from the public fund;

3. **Progressive to endowment**: subject who receives a lower initial endowment will receive a relatively larger share from the public fund.

Each rule has a specific impact on inequality and is able to capture different other-regarding preferences. Equidistribution leaves the status quo because the same amount is distributed and so it keeps unchanged the relative endowment. Proportional rule tends to increase the initial inequality because we expect that rich players contribute more in absolute terms and so they keep a large share of public good. Progressive rule smooths the endowments’ difference because poor players receive the largest share irrespective of their contributions. Notice that the choice of one of these rule has implication on the incentive to cooperate and then on Nash Equilibrium. The best choices for the above mentioned rules are respectively free ride, full contribute and free ride for the poorest.

We try to find a theoretical solution taking into account the heterogeneity of the endowment distribution and the distribution rules. We find the best solution for each possible rules. The generic payoff function in this one shot game with two players is

$$P_i = \alpha[\delta(g_i + g_j)] - g_i$$
Table 1: Nash Equilibrium: Equidistribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cooperate (A)</th>
<th>Not Cooperate (A)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperate (B)</td>
<td>$P_A = \alpha[\delta(g_A + g_B)] - g_A$</td>
<td>$P_A = \alpha[\delta(g_A)]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$P_B = \alpha[\delta(g_A + g_B)] - g_B$</td>
<td>$P_B = \alpha[\delta(g_B)] - g_B$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Cooperate (B)</td>
<td>$P_A = \alpha[\delta g_A] - g_A$</td>
<td>$P_A = 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$P_B = \alpha[\delta g_A]$</td>
<td>$P_B = 0$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

where $P_i$ represents the net payoff, that is the final gain minus the initial endowment, $g_i$ is the individual contribution to public good, $\alpha$ is the coefficient which changes according to the chosen rule, $\delta$ is the efficiency factor.

Equidistribution

Remember that in this case the entire amount is split equally among the components of the same group, regardless of individual contributions.

We find the Nash equilibrium under the hypothesis that $0 < \alpha < 1$ and $\delta > 1$. We find that the Nash equilibrium is to not cooperate until $\delta < 1/\alpha$.

In our setting we fix $\delta = 2$ and $\alpha = 1/n$. This means that the best individual strategy is to free ride for all the level of inequality.

Proportional to contribution

In this case the amount is split according to the individual contribution, that is the greater the contribution the greater the share of public good.

Under the hypothesis that $\delta > 1$ and $\alpha = \frac{g_i}{\sum_{i=1}^n g_i}$ the best individual strategy is to cooperate if $\delta > 0$.

Progressive

This is the unique case in which the share of public good depends on the endowment instead of the contribution. In this case the lower the endowment
Table 3: Nash Equilibrium: Progressive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cooperate(A)</th>
<th>Not Cooperate(A)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperate(B)</td>
<td>$P_A = \alpha[\delta(g_A + g_B)] - g_A$</td>
<td>$P_A = \alpha[\delta(g_B)]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$P_B = \alpha[\delta(g_A + g_B)] - g_B$</td>
<td>$P_B = \alpha[\delta(g_B)] - g_B$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Cooperate(B)</td>
<td>$P_A = \alpha[\delta g_A] - g_A$</td>
<td>$P_A = 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$P_B = \alpha[\delta g_A]$</td>
<td>$P_B = 0$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the higher the share.

The coefficient is equal to $\alpha = \frac{1}{n-1}\left(1 - \frac{d_i}{\sum_{i=1}^n d_i}\right)$ and $\delta > 1$, the best strategy is to cooperate if $\delta > \frac{g_i}{\sum_{i=1}^n d_i}$.

We are not able to find a unique Nash equilibrium but it is obvious that the solution changes according to the coefficient $\alpha$.

We have decided to include in the initial endowment given in each period the share of the public good earned in the previous period. This is because our aim is to investigate how subjects choose the distribution rule in order to change the initial level of inequality. Moreover, in our opinion, this is a more realistic situation since redistributional policy changes the income distribution and the effect persists during the time. The same approach has been used in the setting proposed by Gaechter et al. (2013). In that work authors investigates the relation between inequality and growth using a PGG in which inequality changes endogenously. The payoff function of each player is given by:

$$\pi_{it} = d_{it} - g_{it} + \alpha \delta \sum_{i=1}^n g_{it-1}$$

where $d_{it}$ is the exogenous initial endowment, $g_{it}$ is the portion that player put in the public fund, $\alpha$ is the return of the public good, $\delta$ is the efficiency factor. So, $\alpha \delta \sum_{i=1}^n g_{it-1}$ is the share of public good of the previous period that we add to the initial endowment to allow the accumulation of income during the repetitions.

We use the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism game with five repetitions. We conducted three different sessions during the same day:

* the baseline treatment in which each participant receives the same endowment;
Figure 1: Endowment received in the treatments

* the *low inequality* treatment in which the distribution of the initial endowment has a Gini coefficient of 0.3;

* the *high inequality* treatment in which endowments are very heterogeneous and characterized by a Gini coefficient of 0.6.

In each treatment the total amount available in each group is 500 ECU and it is divided among players in order to have the above mentioned level of inequality. The exact distribution of the endowment in ECU (Experimental Currency) is in Figure 1.

As we can see in each group individuals are classified by “type” and each of them receive different initial endowment. Type 1 and type 2 are the richest in both second and third treatment. The type is randomly assigned, that is each subject has the same probability to receive a high or low endowment. We assign the type at the beginning of the first period and types remain fixed during the game, i.e. each player receives the same endowment $d_i$ in all periods.

At the beginning of each session 35 subjects are randomly allocated in our lab and are divided in groups of five. We have chosen a *between subject* design with partner matching, that is subjects stay in the same group for the entire session and we compare results between treatments.
The experiment was conducted in the lab of the Faculty of Economics of the Università Politecnica delle Marche in May 2013. The experiment was programmed using the software $z$-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)). Before the starting of the game instructions was read aloud and then, when software was started, subjects read written instructions. Participants play and earned ECU during the experiment and at the end of each session players are paid by cash with the exchange rate equal to 1 Euro = 500 ECU. We have randomly drawn 105 undergraduate students (57 female) in Economics registered on the web site EconLabExperiment. All the invited participant received a show-up fee of 3 Euro and those who participate to experiment received an extra payment depending on their own choice during the game. The average earning was 9 Euro and each session lasted more or less 50 minutes. In the Appendix A we show the mean payment for each session and show some screen shots of the main steps of the game.

### 4 Experimental results

We conduct this experiment to test the hypothesis that inequality is detrimental for contribubution to the public good.

In Tables 4 and 5 we show the descriptive statistics of the main variables of interest, that is contribution to public good and contribution in percentage term, that is the contribution divided by the endowment. It is easy to see that in the first treatment, that is those with no initial inequality, the level

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#### Table 4: Descriptive statistics: Contribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contribution</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St.Dev</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Obs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treatment 1</td>
<td>463.48</td>
<td>552.35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2495</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment 2</td>
<td>179.25</td>
<td>310.86</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2450</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment 3</td>
<td>216.22</td>
<td>354.50</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1668</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

3We sent an invitation email to 120 students but only 105 finally participayed. This is a standard procedure in experiments in which a prefixed number of participant is needed. It is necessary to invite more people than the effective number in order to avoid the problem of no-show players.

4It is important to underline that in our experiment the maximum earning per person is 25 Euro. This upper bound depends on administrative constraint.
Table 5: Descriptive statistics: Contribution -percentage-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contribution</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St.Dev</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Obs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treatment 1</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment 2</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment 3</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Statistics test on contribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistics test</th>
<th>Treatment 2</th>
<th>Treatment 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>t-test</td>
<td>t= 6.9021</td>
<td>t= 3.5409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0000)</td>
<td>(0.0005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilcoxon</td>
<td>z= 6.983</td>
<td>z= 3.828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0000)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANOVA</td>
<td></td>
<td>F= 22.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of contribution is the highest both in absolute and relative term. This means that subjects in group with heterogeneous endowment contribute less than those in group with homogeneous endowment. This difference is statistically significant. We consider a parametric test (t-test) and a non parametric test (Wilcoxon signed rank test). As we can see in Table 6, in both cases we reject the null hypothesis and confirm that the mean and the median of contributions in different treatment are different.

Figures 2 and 3 show the average contributions per period respectively in absolute and relative terms. The level of contribution is always greater than zero. Contrary to the main finding of previous experiments, contribution is increasing over repetitions, both in absolute and percentage terms. The highest level of contributions is reached in treatment one. Treatment 2 is the unique in which there is a decline of contributions in percentage terms. In treatment 3 there is an increasing contributions for all the repetitions.
Figure 2: Contribution in absolute term

Figure 3: Contribution in percentage term
The analysis at the aggregate level gives us only information about the path of contribution during the time. We are interested in the analysis of individual preferences, so we have decomposed contributions by types and by subjects.

In Figure 4 we can see contribution in absolute term divided by type. As we already said, we consider five different types in each group. Contribution is increasing in repetitions but the most interesting aspect regards contributions in the third treatment. We expect that rich people contribute more than poor ones in absolute terms. Results about treatment 1 and treatment 2 confirm our initial hypothesis, while in treatment 3 the contributions of type 5 is greater than those of type 1 and type 2. Observing the decomposition of contributions by type, we can see that there is high heterogeneity also between groups in the same treatment. This heterogeneity can not be captured by the analysis at the aggregate level. As we will see later, individuals behave in a very different way also in the same conditions.

The observed behavior suggests us that players have some kind of other-regarding preferences. In particular we should consider two different approaches:

1. conditional cooperator as defined in Fischbacher et al. (2001): the willingness to contribute to public good is increasing with the others contribution;

2. anticipated reciprocity effect as in Cherry et al. (2005) : subjects con-
tribute more when they are in an environment in which also others can contribute the same amount, thus the richest contribute less because they know that the poorest players cannot contribute the same amount.

The analysis of individual contribution is useful to understand agents’ preferences. Figures 5, 6, 7 help us to understand the behavior of players in each period (in brackets the number of the group). In these graphics we report the individual contributions in each period and the dashed lines are the average contributions per group.

According to our graphical results, there is a strong heterogeneity that can not be captured observing only the aggregate result. In the first treatment more or less 85% of people behave as a conditional cooperator, that is they observe the whole contributions of the group and play the same strategy. In fact, individual contributions follow the same shape of the average contribution. Only one player, i.e. player 120, behaves as an unconditional cooperator, that is she puts the entire amount in the public good in all periods regardless of others’ contributions. Finally, 10% can be classified as free riders, in the sense that they reduce drastically their contribution in the last period. In the second treatment we observe that 40% of people free ride in the last period. The remaining 60% behave as conditional cooperators. Regarding the third treatment we observe a situation like those in first one. Also in this case there is only one unconditional cooperator, i.e. player 314. The majority of people shows a “hump” shaped path and probably it depends on the observed behavior of other people of the same group. In the third group the type 5, that is the poorest player in the group, contribute systematically an amount lower than the average. In three groups the richest type contributes a positive amount but always lower than the average of their groups.

Before concluding the individual analysis, we can say that in the first treatment the shape of the contribution among group is quite similar. This can be seen as a measure of trust in the group, because after the first period they are able to find and respect an agreement on the strategy of high contributions. In the second treatment there is no evidence about trust among players of the same group, indeed it seems that at least one per group tries to cheat others player. Does inequality influence trust in the group? Yes, it to do, in our opinion. In the first treatment the interaction was among people with the same endowment, so they have an incentive to trust in the agreement decided in the chat. In the other setting the level of trust is strongly influenced from the information that there are “poor people” and that those have incentive to free ride. In other words, especially in the third treatment rich players have no incentive to contribute a large amount because they
know that in their groups other people have a very low endowments and so they are not able to contribute with the same amount. This is consistent with the so called “anticipated reciprocity effect” (Cherry et al. (2005))

As we have already said, each session starts with different levels of inequality, but the accumulation of public good share and the choice of one specific distribution rule have the power to change the income distribution and thus the level of inequality.

We have chosen to consider the Gini index as a measure of inequality. Figure 8 shows this index calculated in each period. Treatment 2 and 3 start with a level of inequality equal to 0.3 and 0.6, respectively. In treatment 1, all players receive the same endowment and, due to the accumulation of wealth during the game, the level of inequality increases. In treatment 2 there is drastic reduction in the first period but in the last period the level of inequality grows up to 0.2. In the third treatment we observe a strong reduction of the level of inequality until period 4, and in the last period there is a small increasing in inequality. It seems that the inequality tends to reach the same level around 0.3. The explanation for the variation in Gini coefficient is not only attributable to the initial endowment distribution and the level of contribution because they are always increasing and do not show an “hump” shape. The only other factor can be influence the inequality is the choice of redistribution rule.

In table 9 we report how many times a specific rule has been chosen. In the first treatment the most voted rule is the progressive. Obviously this is the rule which increases the level of inequality, in fact in this treatment starting with homogeneous endowment they reach a level of inequality equal to 0.1.

In the second treatment the preferred rule is the equidistribution, but also the proportional one has been chosen 30% of times. Observing these choice divided by period, we notice that at the beginning the majority of groups chooses equidistribution while at in the last trial we observe that the preference is for Proportional rule. Again, this confirm our hypothesis about the variation in inequality.

The unique treatment in which most of the group choose the progressive rule is the third. In this treatment there are only type 1 who is very rich while the others are poor. This means that player 1 has great bargaining power and she can decide to contribute nothing to public good if she does not like the decision rule chosen by the majority. Despite this fact they adopt the progressive rule and this can be interpreted as an iniquity averse behavior as defined in Fehr and Shmidt (1999). This kind of preferences brought subjects to reduce the inequality in the environment in which she makes her decision to increase her own utility.
Figure 5: Average individual contributions per period (treatment 1)
Figure 6: Average individual contributions per period (treatment 2)
Figure 7: Average individual contributions per period (treatment 3)
**Figure 8:** The Gini coefficient in each period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Equidistribution</th>
<th>Proportional</th>
<th>Progressive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treatment 1</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment 2</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment 3</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 9:** Chosen rules in each treatment
Looking at Figure 9, it seems that the greater is the level of exogenous inequality, the higher the percentage of times that the progressive rule has been chosen. To test this hypothesis, and so to test individual inequity aversion, we run a Probit regression in which the dependent variable is the probability that a specific rule has been chosen. Output regression is shown in Table 7 and we run three different estimations, one for each rule. It is easy to see that the higher the inequality, the lower the probability to choose the proportional rule. On the other hand, high inequality increases the probability to observe that players choose the progressive rule. These results confirms that players act in order to reduce the inequality.

### 5 Inequality and contributions: estimation results

The last step that help us to interpret our result and that can confirm or reject our hypothesis is econometric analysis. We have a panel data in which N=105 and T=5. We try to estimate the impact of inequality and other variables on the individual contributions. The dependent variable \( y_{it} \) is the individual contributions, the explanatory variables \( x_{it} \) are:

- **Gini:** we calculate the Gini coefficient within groups as a measure of inequality;
- **Endowment:** is the endowment which includes also the share of public good in the previous period (see equation 1 in Section 2.4);
- \( \alpha \): is the coefficient relative to the chosen redistribution choice, i.e. in the equidistribution the coefficient is \( 1/n = 0.2 \).
We consider a log-linear estimation, that is only the dependent variable is expressed in logarithmic scale. Contribution shows a skewed distribution, thus we use the logarithmic transformation to obtain a normally distributed variable. The explanatory variables are measured at the beginning of each period.

The model we estimate is

$$y_{it} = a_i + \beta_0 \gamma_{it} + \beta_1 d_{it} + \beta_2 \alpha_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$$

in which $a_i = a + \mu_i$, $\gamma_{it}$ is the Gini index, $d_{it}$ is the endowment, $\alpha_{it}$ the share of public good and $\epsilon_{it}$ is the overall error term. We estimate this model with Fixed Effect (FE). The estimation methods for FE model is based on the Least Squares with Dummy Variables (LSDV). Results are shown in Table 8. We are interesting in the impact of inequality on contribution, and our results show negative and significant impact of endowment heterogeneity on contribution. As we expect, both Endowment and the coefficient $\alpha$ have a positive impact on contributions. This means that players with relative high endowment are willing to contribute a large share in the public fund. Regarding the coefficient, we have already seen that the average contributions vary according to the chosen rule. The estimation result confirms that the higher the coefficient, the higher is the contribution.

These results point out the negative correlation between inequality and cooperation and this confirms our graphical results in the previous section.

The graphical analysis of individual behavior suggests that players behave as reciprocators. This means that they are willing to increase the contribution to Public Good if others components of the group put a large amount in the fund. Now we try to validate graphical results with econometric analysis. The hypothesis to test is that if individuals behave as a reciprocator then the aggregate contributions of partner affects their own contributions in the next period. The result is that this hypothesis is confirmed in Table 9.

We run a panel regression with FE specification in which the dependent variable is the individual contribution (in log) and the explanatory variables

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\(^5\)We compare FE and RE specification using the Hansen J test ($\chi^2 = 62.685$, $p-value = 0.000$). We consider robust standard errors to take into account the problem of heteroskedasticity. We test for serial correlation using the Wooldridge test ($F = 1.170$, $p-value = 0.281$), and cross sectional correlation using the Friedman test ($\chi^2 = 89.790$, $p-value = 0.998$).

\(^6\)The payoff function depends both on the exogenous endowment and on the share of contribution in the previous period. This implies that the regressors are not exogenous. In other words, in our setting should be the case that $E(x_i \epsilon_{it}) \neq 0$. To verify this hypothesis we should consider an estimation with Instrumental variables. We are not able to run this regression because we have not exogenous variables to use as instruments.
Table 8: Output Regression: Fixed Effect

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>logContribution</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini</td>
<td>-0.011**</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endowment</td>
<td>0.002***</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td>0.037***</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.761***</td>
<td>(0.138)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>525</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-sq (overall)</td>
<td>0.538</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

are the lag aggregate endowment ($d$), that is the sum of the endowment of the others of the same group, and the lag of aggregate contribution of the partner ($g$), that is the sum of contribution of other players in the same group.

As in Table 9, the aggregate endowment has no significant impact on individual contribution. The aggregate contributions strongly influences individual choices. In particular, the positive coefficient of $\gamma$ confirms the hypothesis of reciprocity. Indeed, the higher the others contributions in the previous period, the higher the willingness to contribute to the public good.

Summing up, estimation results show that individual choices are strongly influenced by the environment. In particular, our results confirm that the endowment distribution and partners’ behavior influence agents’ willingness to cooperate. Moreover, look at the chosen rules in each treatment, we should deduce that players show inequity averse preferences.

6 Conclusion and further analysis

The focus of this experiment is the impact of heterogeneous endowment on the propensity to cooperate in a Public Good Game. The analysis of individual behavior in three different sessions with zero, middle and high inequality, helps us to validate the prediction of Neoclassical Economics. Under the assumption of the Neoclassical Theory, the economic agent is characterized by perfect rationality and she is selfish. Using the tool of standard game
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>log Contribution</th>
<th>$\beta$ / SE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\sum_{i=1}^{4} d_{it-1}$</td>
<td>0.191 (0.205)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sum_{i=1}^{4} g_{it-1}$</td>
<td>0.639*** (0.151)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.029 (0.605)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dependent Variable: Individual Contributions (log)

theory the prediction is that in the Public Good Game the best choice is to contribute zero and to free ride.

Using experimental economics it is possible to investigate the real behavior of economic agents and verify the correctness of the assumption of standard theory. Our work shows that people are not selfish and contribute in each period a positive amount of their initial endowment. The major findings are:

- inequality on the endowment distribution within groups is detrimental for cooperation;

- contribution, both in absolute and percentage terms, is increasing over time contrary to previous results. This depends on the possibility to accumulate the share of public good earned in each period;

- about 90% of subjects contribute in each period a positive amount. This implies that agents are not selfish;

- estimation results of our regression show that players are *conditional cooperators*;

- in the setting with high inequality, there is evidence that individuals’ behavior tends to decrease the initial inequality using a progressive redistribution policy.

These results confirm that the assumptions of economic theory are very strong and we have shown that the aggregate results are not able to capture
the individual heterogeneity. Moreover, the individual behavior is strongly influenced by the context and, in our opinion, it is interesting to analyze agents in a connected environment instead of using the representative agent.

At macro level, we have few observation to generalize the negative impact of inequality and growth. Moreover, we are interested to analyze the causality between these two variables. These will be the focus of future experiments.

References


A Experiments using z-tree: Public Good Game

We use the software z-tree to conduct experiments. In this appendix we report the instruction (translated from Italian). At the beginning of the experiment we read aloud the instruction. After the allocation of each player in a random order, each of them read the instruction on their own screen. To each player we assign a random number and they seat according to this number. This procedure ensures that the formation of groups is random and avoid the identification of the members of each group.

This is an experiment to study individual decision making. In this game players will be allocated in group of five. Each participant play anonymously. You will earn money in experimental currency. At the end of the game the final profit will be converted in Euro. The minimum amount is 3 Euro while the maximum amount is 25 Euro. Your final profit depends on your and others’ decisions.

You will be placed in a group of five. The people in your group will not change during the experiment, but you will not know the identity of who is in your group, during the experiment or afterwards. The other three people in your group will have screen names of 2, 3, 4 and 5. There will be 5 periods in the experiment. Although the real identity of each of the other people in your group is unknown to you, each screen name will refer to the same person during the game.

At the beginning of the period each person in your group will receive an endowment (in ECU). In each period you will see your and others’ profit. You must decide how to divide this amount between a group account and a personal account. The money you assign to your personal account goes into your earnings. The money put in the public account will be redistributed among the component of the group.

The total amount of the group account is the sum of the individual contributions. You will see the total amount of the fund and you decide how to split this amount according to these rules:

1. Equidistribution: the total amount will be split equally among the component of the group;

2. Proportional to contribution: the share you will receive will be proportional to your contribution to the public fund;

3. Progressive to endowment: the share of the public account will be
divided according to the distribution of the endowment; the poorest will take the highest share of the fund.

You must find an agreement about the redistribution rule using a chat group. In the chat you will communicate only with others' of your group and you must talk only about the redistribution rule. After having found an agreement, you will vote for a specific rule. The account will be split according to the rule which receive the majority of votes, that is at least 3 votes.

The share of public fund you earned in each period will be added to the initial endowment of the next period. Each period is like the others. At the end of the game you will fill a questionnaire about your personal information. Your profit will be converted and you will paid by cash.